In this paper we construct two new fuzzy identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes in the random oracle model. Not only do our schemes provide public parameters whose size is independent of the number of attributes in each identity (used as public key) but they also have useful structures which result in more efficient key extraction and/or encryption than the random oracle version of Sahai and Water's fuzzy IBE scheme, considered recently by Pirretti et al. We prove that the confidentiality of the proposed schemes is relative to the Bilinear Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
INTRODUCTION
Motivation. The concept of fuzzy identity-based encryption (IBE) recently introduced by Sahai and Waters [8] is to provide an error-tolerance property for IBE. Namely, in fuzzy IBE, a user with the secret key for the identity ω can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with the public key ω if ω and ω are within a certain distance of each other.
As noted in [8] , fuzzy IBE can directly be applied to the situation where a user is traveling and another party wants to encrypt at an ad-hoc meeting between them. Another application of fuzzy IBE is "attribute-based encryption [8, 6, 7] " where a party can encrypt data to all users that have a certain set of attributes, e.g. {company, division, department}.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Related Work. Since Sahai and Water's work, fuzzy IBE has been discussed in the context of the attribute-based encryption (ABE). Very recently, Goyal et al. [6] proposed an ABE scheme that provides fine-grained sharing of encrypted data. Piretti et al. [7] used Sahai and Waters' "large universe" construction of fuzzy IBE, which we simply call "Sahai-Waters construction", to realize their secure information management architecture. They also observed that if the random oracle [2] is employed, computational overhead of the Sahai-Waters construction can greatly be reduced. We remark that the random oracle not only reduces computational overhead but also provides a very short public parameters whose size is independent of the number of attributes associated with an identity or the number of attributes in the defined universe, which is crucial in the storage constrained applications.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we go one step beyond Pirreti et al.'s results by presenting fuzzy IBE schemes in the random oracle model, which are structurally different from the Sahai-Waters construction. We show that the structural difference results in more efficient schemes than even the random oracle version of the Sahai-Waters construction considered by Pirretti et al. [7] . We prove that our schemes meet the security requirements as defined in [8] assuming that the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem is hard.
PRELIMINARIES
Computational Primitives. We first review the definition of the admissible bilinear pairing [3] , denoted by e. Let G1 and G2 be groups of the same order q which is prime. (By G * 1 and Z Z * q , we denote G 1 \ {1} where 1 is the identity element of G 1 , and Z Z q \ {0} respectively). Suppose that G 1 is generated by g. Then, e :
ab , for all a, b ∈ Z Zq and 2) Non-degenerate: e(g, g) = 1.
A computational problem that will be used throughout this paper is the DBDH problem, a decisional version of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem on which Boneh and Franklin's IBE scheme [3] is based. Informally, the DBDH problem refers to the problem where, given (g,
abc from e(g, g) γ for random γ ∈ Z Z * q . Fuzzy IBE and Its Security. The generic fuzzy IBE scheme [8] consists of the following algorithms.
• Setup(): Providing some security parameter as input, the Private Key Generator (PKG) runs this algorithm to generate its master key mk and public parameters params which contains an error tolerance parameter d. Note that params is given to all interested parties while mk is kept secret.
• Extract(mk, ID): Providing the master key mk and an identity ID as input, the PKG runs this algorithm to generate a private key associated with ID, denoted by D ID .
• Encrypt(params, ID , M ): Providing the public parameters params, an identity ID , and a plaintext M as input, a sender runs this algorithm to generate a ciphertext C .
• Decrypt(params, DID, C ): Providing the public parameters params, a private key D ID associated with the identity ID and a ciphertext C encrypted with an identity ID such that |ID ∩ ID| ≥ d as input, a receiver runs this algorithm to get a decryption, which is either a plaintext or a "Reject" message.
A first security requirement of fuzzy IBE is "indistinguishability of encryptions under fuzzy selective-ID, chosen plaintext attack (IND-FSID-CPA)" [8] . (Note that the "selective-ID attack" [4] refers to the attack in which an attacker commits ahead of time an identity that it intends to attack.) The formal definition based on the game between an attacker A and the "Challenger" is as follows.
In Phase 1, A outputs a challenge identity ID * . In Phase 2, the Challenger then runs the Setup algorithm to generate a master key mk and public parameters params. The Challenger gives params to A while keeps mk secret from A. In Phase 3, A issues private key extraction queries, each of which is denoted by ID. A restriction here is that for all ID, |ID ∩ ID * | < d. In Phase 4, A outputs equal-length messages M0 and M1. Upon receiving (M0, M1), the Challenger picks β ∈ {0, 1} at random and creates a challenge ciphertext C * = Encrypt(params, ID * , M β ). The Challenger returns C * to A. In Phase 5, A issues a number of private key extraction queries as in Phase 3. In Phase 6, A outputs its guess β ∈ {0, 1}.
We define A's guessing advantage by
Notice that a stronger notion "indistinguishability of encryptions under fuzzy selective-ID, chosen ciphertext attack (IND-FSID-CCA)" can also be defined by giving A an access to a decryption oracle.
Another important security requirement for a fuzzy IBE scheme is the security against colluding attack, which implies that no group of users should be able to combine their keys in such a way that they can decrypt a ciphertext that none of them alone could [8] .
PROPOSED FUZZY IBE SCHEMES
In the rest of the paper, ∆a,S denotes the Lagrange coefficient for a ∈ Z Z * q (q, a prime) and a set S of elements in Z Z * q . Notice that
Without loss of generality, we assume that an identity is a set of n different elements in Z Z * q . For example, each of n strings of arbitrary length with an index i ∈ Z can be hashed using some collision-resistant hash function whose range is Z Z * q . Efficient Fuzzy IBE-I (EFIBE-I) Scheme. As mentioned earlier the hash function H in our first fuzzy IBE scheme is assumed to be the random oracle, which gives rise to very short public parameters. However, we note that our scheme has a different structure compared to the random oracle version of the Sahai-Waters construction considered in [7] . The unique feature of EFIBE-I is that its private key extraction algorithm (Extract) is structurally simple and highly efficient.
• Setup(): Generate a group G 1 of prime order q. Construct a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2, where G2 is a group of the same order q. Pick a generator g of the group G 1 . Pick g 1 ∈ G 1 at random. Pick s ∈ Z Z * q at random and compute g 2 = g s . Choose a hash function H : Z Z * q → G 1 . Select a tolerance parameter d. Output a public parameter params = (q, g, e, G1, G2, H, g1, g2, d ) and a master key mk = (q, g, e, G1, G2, H, g1, g2, x) .
• Extract(mk, ID), where ID = (µ1, . . . , µn): Pick a random polynomial p(·) of degree d − 1 over Z Zq such that p(0) = s and compute a private key
• Encrypt(params, ID , M ), where ID = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) and M ∈ G2: Pick r ∈ Z Z * q at random and compute
• Decrypt(params, DID, C ), where C is encrypted with
Choose an arbitrary set S ⊆ ID ∩ ID such that |S| = d and compute
It is easy to see that the decryption algorithm is correct. The above EFIBE-I scheme is proven to be IND-FSID-CPA secure in the random oracle model assuming that the DBDH problem is hard. The proof is given in the full version of this paper [1] .
By the same argument as [8] , the EFIBE-I scheme prevents collusion attacks since each users' private key components are generated with different random polynomials.-Even if multiple users collude, they will not be able to combine their private key components to form a key which is useful to compromise the confidentiality of the scheme.
Efficient Fuzzy IBE-II (EFIBE-II) Scheme. Our second fuzzy IBE scheme bears some similarities to the second scheme based on the DBDH problem [8] . However, its private key extraction has been simplified by using the outputs of the chosen random polynomial as random exponents for g 1 , in contrast to the scheme in [8] which introduces extra random exponents and hence incurs extra exponentiations. More precisely, our scheme computes (( [8] to generate a private key associated with an identity ID = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) . A description of the scheme is as follows.
• Setup(): Generate a group G1 of prime order q. Construct a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , where G 2 is a group of the same order q. Pick a generator g of the group
Output a public parameter params = (q, g, e, G1, G2, H, g1, g2, d ) and a master key mk = (q, g, e, G 1 , G 2 , H, g 1 , g 2 , x ).
• Extract(mk, ID), where ID = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ): Pick a random polynomial p(·) of degree d − 1 over Z Zq such that p(0) = s and compute a private key
• Encrypt (params, ID , M ), where ID = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) and M ∈ G 2 : Pick r ∈ Z Z * q at random and compute
• Decrypt(params, DID, C ), where C is encrypted with ID such that |ID ∩ ID| ≥ d (Recall that ID = (µ1, . . . , µn) ).: Choose an arbitrary set S ⊆ ID ∩ ID such that |S| = d and compute
Note that one can easily show that the above decryption algorithm is correct. The above EFIBE-II scheme is proven to be IND-FSID-CPA secure in the random oracle model assuming that the DBDH problem is hard. The proof is given in the full version of this paper [1] .
We also note that from the same reason as EFIBE-I, EFIBE-II is also secure against collusion attacks.
Finally we remark that EFIBE-I and EFIBE-II can be extended to achieve chosen ciphertext security using the technique like the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform [5] . Table 1 summarizes the size of various parameters and the cost of computing sub-algorithms of the proposed fuzzy IBE schemes and the random oracle version of the Sahai-Waters construction [7] , which we denote by SW-RO.
COMPARISONS
Notice that both Extract and Encrypt algorithms of EFIBE-II are more efficient than those of SW-RO. The Extract algorithm of EFIBE-I is the most efficient among the three schemes but its Encrypt is slightly less efficient than those of EFIBE-II and SW-RO.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we proposed two efficient fuzzy IBE schemes, which are proven to be secure in the random oracle model.
We expect that our new fuzzy IBE schemes will serve as efficient building blocks for biometric authentication systems or attribute-based encryption systems. Construction of fuzzy IBE schemes that have the exactly the same structures as ours (that is, non-random oracle version of our schemes using the technique of [8] ) is an interesting open problem.
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